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Gifford v Strang and the new landscape for recovery for psychiatric injury in 
Australia 
 
 Dr Des Butler
*
  
Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd was the third recent High Court case dealing with liability for 
psychiatric injuries. This article examines that decision, with references to the other two cases Tame v New 
South Wales and Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd. It places these judgments in the context of the 
recommendations concerning mental harm in the recent Ipp Panel's review of negligence and subsequent 
tort reform legislation. It will be seen that far from removing uncertainty and inconsistencies, Australian law 
concerning psychiatric injury has never been more divided. 
 
1.  Introduction 
In Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd 
1
 the High Court completed a triumvirate of cases dealing 
with psychiatric injury claims, which also included the dual case of Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v 
Australian Stations Pty Ltd.
2
 The cases spanned the two types of claim generally encountered in relation to 
this form of injury. Tame  involved a so-called 'primary victim' scenario, wherein a plaintiff alleges that he 
or she has suffered psychiatric injury as the result of being the subject of the defendant's conduct. By 
contrast, Annetts  and Gifford  both involved 'secondary victim' scenarios, wherein a plaintiff alleges that he 
or she has suffered psychiatric injury as the result of the death, injury or imperilment of a third person. 
Together, the three cases provided the opportunity for the court to settle an area of common law which for 
long has been bristling with contentious issues and to provide guidance for lower courts which have for some 
time struggled to divine the law from ageing and imperfect High Court authorities, such as the 1984 decision 
in Jaensch v Coffey
3
 and the 1970 decision in Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey.
4
 In particular, the cases provided 
the High Court with the opportunity to decide whether to adopt the strict primary/secondary victim 
dichotomy approach to psychiatric injury claims, with arbitrary control mechanisms governing the latter, 
along the lines of the current approach of the House of Lords, or to adopt the more flexible attitude that has 
found favour with a number of judges over the years.
5 
 
It would be misleading, however, to discuss the post-Gifford psychiatric injury landscape without some 
mention of recent legislative change in the wake of the Ipp Panel's review of negligence as it applied to 
personal injury claims.
6
 This review was constituted by the Federal Government in response to fears of 
rapidly rising insurance costs, which threatened the viability of a variety of organisations and activities 
  
ranging from surf lifesavers to pony rides and church fetes. The panel made a number of recommendations 
concerning mental harm, which have been enacted to varying degrees by most but not all Australian 
jurisdictions. 
 
This article comprises a number of sections. It commences with a brief consideration of the dual case Tame  
and Annetts, which has already been the subject of an earlier note.
7
 It then examines the decision in Gifford 
in detail, before discussing the common law landscape that has now emerged in Australia. It concludes with 
an outline of the Ipp Panel's recommendations concerning mental harm and the subsequent legislative tort 
reform of the area. 
 
2.  Tame and Annetts: a brief revisit 
Tame was the case concerning a plaintiff who was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a drunk driver. 
By mistake the investigating police officer entered the same high blood alcohol reading against both drivers 
on the Police Accident Report. Although the mistake was quickly identified and corrected, the plaintiff 
alleged that she had suffered psychiatric injury after learning of the error, based on the fear that other people 
may have been led to think that she had been responsible for the accident. 
 
By contrast, Annetts  involved two parents who entrusted their 16-year-old son to the care of the defendant, 
the owner and operator of a large cattle station in Western Australia, on the basis of an express assurance that 
he would be working as a jackeroo in supervised surroundings. Contrary to the assurance, the boy was posted 
to a lonely station outpost. The boy decamped and became lost in the desert. An extensive search was 
conducted, with the boy's parents travelling several times from their home in New South Wales. Several 
months later the parents were contacted by police by telephone and informed that the boy's remains had been 
found. 
 
Although the cases were argued separately, the High Court delivered the judgments together. In relation to 
Tame, there was a reiteration of the proposition that a plaintiff in psychiatric injury claims is required to 
show a 'recognisable psychiatric illness' as the requisite form of damage.
8
 However, there was less agreement 
concerning other issues. Several judges made observations concerning the determination of the existence of a 
duty of care in such cases. For example, Gleeson CJ stressed the importance of any foreseeability of harm 
being reasonable. With evidence of Mrs Tame's special vulnerability, it was not reasonable to expect the 
  
police officer to have had her in his contemplation as a person who could be affected by his conduct.
9
 By 
contrast, Gaudron J suggested that it was important to identify a relationship between plaintiff and defendant 
that makes the former someone who ought to have been in contemplation of the latter as a person closely and 
directly affected by the latter's acts.
10
 Several judges thought that coherency in the law was an important 
reason for denying the existence of a duty of care in the circumstances. As someone under a duty to fully and 
properly investigate an incident, the police officer could hardly owe a subject of that investigation a duty to 
avoid causing her stress.
11
 Further, since the matter reflected on Mrs Tame's reputation, the cause of action, if 
any, was more properly framed in defamation. Recognition of a duty of care in the circumstances would 
encroach upon this settled area.
12 
 
An important matter upon which their Honours disagreed was the proper approach to the concept of 'normal' 
(or 'ordinary') 'fortitude'. This concept reflects the notion that the plaintiff's reaction ought in some way to be 
judged against the standard of a person of 'normal' susceptibility. Views differed not only in relation to the 
meaning of 'normal fortitude', but also in relation to its appropriate role. As to the meaning of the term, 
Gleeson CJ noted that the phrase did not reflect the deluded view that such a person existed, but instead 
denoted the view that some persons have such a degree of susceptibility that their reactions are beyond the 
limits of reasonable foreseeability.
13
 That was the case here, with the medical evidence showing that Mrs 
Tame was particularly vulnerable.
14
 Other judges seemed to take a more objective approach in the sense of 
postulating how a hypothetical person of notional normal fortitude would have reacted in the circumstances. 
 
As to the proper role of the concept, several judges saw reasonable foreseeability of the risk of a person of 
normal fortitude suffering psychiatric injury in the circumstances as a factor in determining whether a duty of 
care arose.
15
 By contrast, Gummow and Kirby JJ saw it as relevant to the question of whether the duty was 
breached.
16
 Hayne J saw normal fortitude as an important legal response to the cases entitled to recovery, 
since the medical response to which type of injury should be compensable would otherwise be too broad.
17
 
Only McHugh and Callinan JJ expressly regarded 'normal fortitude' as a precondition to recovery,
18
 although 
it may be that Hayne J in linking the concept to the kind of damage, which is an essential factor in all cases 
of psychiatric injury, also effectively elevated the concept to prerequisite status. 
 
It seems that Annetts did not prove as good a vehicle for examination of the principles relevant to a 
secondary victim scenario as may have been first thought. Prima facie the case involved problematic features 
such as a psychiatric injury resulting from a dawning realisation rather than a sudden affront to the senses, 
  
distant plaintiffs learning about the imperilment and ultimate death of a loved one through third party 
communication rather than direct perception, and whether a 'normal' parent would have suffered psychiatric 
injury in the circumstances. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia took a restrictive 
approach to these matters, upholding a trial judge's decision that there was no cause of action stated on the 
assumed facts on the grounds of an absence of a sudden shock or direct perception, and the view that a 
normal parent who had a dawning realisation that his or her 16-year-old child was lost would not suffer 
psychiatric injury. 
 
However, on appeal to the High Court, it was held that the defendant's assurances to the plaintiffs that their 
son would be safe and supervised was an important factor in finding that a duty to exercise care had arisen. 
As such, the case did not turn on the need for a sudden shock or direct perception. Nevertheless, most of the 
judges took the opportunity to express obiter the view that in Australia neither sudden shock nor direct 
perception was to be regarded as a precondition of liability; instead, they were no more than factors relevant 
to, for example, reasonable foreseeability in the circumstances.
19
 Only Callinan J was of the opinion that 
shock and direct perception were essential elements in secondary victim claims,
20
 although his Honour 
interpreted 'shock' and 'perception' in a somewhat generous fashion by holding that hearing news of the loss 
of their son via the telephone calls came 'out of the blue' and as 'thunderclaps' and was therefore sufficient. 
 
One matter that attracted a unanimous conclusion was the anticipated reaction of a 'normal parent' in such 
circumstances. In approaching this question, the court had before it the views of the members of the High 
Court of the 1930s when deciding Chester v Waverley Corporation.
21
  In that case four members of the court 
thought that a 'normal' mother who saw the dead body of her child being dragged from a water-filled trench 
after going missing for several hours would not suffer psychological consequences. For one judge this was 
because death was not an infrequent event.
22
 Only Evatt J dissented against the 'indurate-hearted' mother 
fashioned by the majority. Likewise the judges in Annetts adopted a more realistic and compassionate 
attitude to the expected reaction of 'normal' parents, overruling the 'indurate heart' contemplated by the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. As Callinan J observed, the circumstances of the 
disappearance and death, and their communication, 'could well, and reasonably foreseeably inflict psychiatric 
harm upon stoic parents, let alone parents of only ordinary fortitude'.
23
 In the end result the case was remitted 
for trial of the action. 
  
3.  Gifford v Strang 
If Annetts ultimately proved to be an imperfect opportunity to explore the law governing 'secondary victim' 
claims, the same could not be said of the appeals in Gifford. Indeed, it was said of Gifford that 'a more 
suitable vehicle for the grant of special leave in a nervous shock case could hardly be found'.
24 
 
The defendant-respondent was a stevedoring company which employed a man who was crushed to death by 
a forklift. Negligence on the part of the forklift driver, who was also employed by the defendant, was not in 
issue. The deceased man's three children, aged 19, 17 and 14, were later informed of the accident. 
Subsequently, the three children and their mother all claimed to have suffered psychiatric injury in 
consequence of learning about what had happened to the deceased. At trial the mother's claim was dismissed 
on the ground that she could not demonstrate that she had suffered psychiatric injury, but had merely been 
affected by normal grief of a kind that was not regarded as being compensable. The claims of the children 
were dismissed on the ground that the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW) s 4(1)(b) 
provided that the defendant was under no liability for the 'nervous shock' suffered by the children because 
their father had not been killed, injured or put in peril within their sight or hearing. On appeal, the NSW 
Court of Appeal regarded the decision based on s 4(1)(b) as incorrect. Nevertheless, it dismissed the 
children's appeals on the basis that because they had merely been told about the incident and did not directly 
perceive either the accident or its aftermath, there could be no duty of care at common law.
25
 On appeal to 
the High Court, the respondent sought to have the appeals dismissed on the grounds that no duty of care 
arose at common law and on the basis of s 4(1)(b) (as accepted by the trial judge). The appellants countered 
the latter by arguing that s 4(1)(b) had been displaced by the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) s 
151P, which purportedly conferred a right of action for psychiatric injuries resulting from workplace 
accidents on workers and families of workers.  
 
(a)  Section 4(1) of the Law Reform Act 1944 
This section was still in effect when the facts in Gifford took place. By the time the appeals reached the High 
Court, the section had been replaced by the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 30. The section relevantly 
provided as follows: 
 
(1) The liability of any person in respect of injury caused after the commencement of this Act 
by an act, neglect or default by which any other person is killed, injured or put in peril shall 
  
extend to include liability for the injury arising wholly or in part for mental or nervous shock 
sustained by:  
 
(a)  a parent or the husband or wife of the person so killed, injured or put in peril; or 
(b)  any other member of the family of the person so killed, injured or put in peril 
where such person was killed, injured or put in peril within the sight or hearing of 
such member of the family. 
 
As McHugh J pointed out, when the section was enacted it was intended as a beneficial provision expanding 
the ability of close family members to recover for nervous shock, being a response to the perceived 
inadequacies in the common law as it then stood, following the decisions of the High Court and House of 
Lords respectively in Chester v Waverley Corporation
26
 and Bourhill v Young,
27
 by removing the need for a 
family member to show the existence of a duty to the family member or that psychiatric injury to that person 
was reasonably foreseeable. The legislative history
28
 shows that while the section was the result of a 
parliamentary compromise as to the desirable extent of reform of the law, it was intended to confer rather 
than take away rights. Apart from anything else, this is made clear by the use of the words 'shall extend to 
include liability' of a certain kind in certain circumstances, which was difficult to reconcile with a legislative 
intention comprehensively to define the scope of liability to the exclusion of the common law.
29 
 
That conclusion was in no way affected by the Workers Compensation Act s 151P. That section was not an 
independent source of rights. It was clear from the other sections in this statute, such as ss 151 and 151E, that 
the common law was affirmed in the case of workplace injuries except to the extent that was otherwise 
provided in s 151P. In other words, rather than conferring rights, s 151P operated to limit the right to recover 
damages in an action for psychiatric injuries resulting from a workplace accident to claims by injured 
workers and members of their close families.
30
 
 
(b)  The common law 
That then left the question whether a duty of care arose at common law. For several of the judges, the answer 
involved reaffirming many of the obiter observations that they had made in Annetts. 
 
Gleeson CJ held that the proposition stated by the Court of Appeal and relied upon by the respondent, that 
there could be no liability at common law for mental injury to a person who was told about an accident 
  
involving a loved one and who did not actually perceive the incident or its aftermath, was inconsistent with 
the reasoning of the High Court in Tame-Annetts and could not stand with the actual decision in Annetts. The 
need for a sudden shock or direct perception of an incident or its aftermath was therefore to be rejected.
31
 
However, his Honour repeated the view he had expressed in Tame-Annetts that the existence of a duty of care 
required more than mere reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric injury, in the sense of it being not 
far-fetched or fanciful. Such would lead to the imposition of an unreasonable burden upon freedom of action 
and personal security if reasonable foreseeability were to involve no more than mere predictability. Instead, 
his Honour believed that the central issue was whether it was reasonable to require the defendant to have in 
contemplation the risk of this psychiatric injury to the plaintiff and to take reasonable care to guard against 
such injury.
32
 Relevant to deciding this issue was the burden that would be placed upon those in the position 
of the defendant by requiring them to anticipate and guard against harm of that kind. Gleeson CJ considered 
that it was reasonable for an employer to have in contemplation, not only an employee, but also his or her 
children, when considering the risk of psychiatric injury resulting from the employer's conduct, it not being 
beyond the 'common experience of mankind' for a child to suffer psychiatric injury in consequence of 
learning of a terrible and fatal accident involving his or her father. His Honour stated that: 
 
Not all children have a close and intimate relationship with their parents; and it may be that, 
even when parents are killed in sudden and tragic circumstances, most grieving children do not 
suffer psychiatric injury. However, as a class, children form an obvious category of people who 
might be expected to be at risk of the kind of injury in question. When there is a class of 
person, such as children, who are recognised, by the law, and by society, as being ordinarily in 
a relationship of natural love and affection with another class, their parents, then it is not 
unreasonable to require that an employer of a person in the second class, whose acts or 
omissions place an employee at risk of physical injury, should also have in contemplation the 
risk of consequent psychiatric injury to a member of the first class.
33
 
 
It was noted above that in Tame-Annetts McHugh J refrained from expressing any view in relation to the 
validity of limiting liability for psychiatric injury to cases involving sudden shock or where the plaintiff 
directly perceived a distressing event or its immediate aftermath, on the grounds that such matters were not 
directly an issue in that case. In Gifford, however, his Honour noted that the other members of the court had 
held in Annetts that the common law in Australia did not recognise such limits and that for that reason the 
Court of Appeal was in error in this case. Addressing the question in this case, his Honour thought it was so 
common and widely known a phenomenon that those who have a close and loving relationship with a person 
  
who is killed or injured often suffer psychiatric injury on learning of the injury or death or observing the 
suffering of that person, that a wrongdoer must have it in mind when contemplating a course of action that 
could affect others. That sufficiently constituted those in a close and loving relationship with the person 
harmed as the neighbours of a wrongdoer and therefore as persons who were owed a duty of care.
34
 
However, he stressed that it was the closeness and affection of the relationship rather than the legal status of 
the relationship that was relevant in determining whether a duty was owed to the person suffering psychiatric 
harm: 
 
The relationship between two friends who have lived together for many years may be closer 
and more loving than that of two siblings. There is no policy justification for preventing a claim 
for nervous shock by a person who was not a family member but who has a close and loving 
relationship with the person harmed or put in peril. In a claim for nervous shock at common 
law, the reasonable foresight of the defendant extends to all those with whom the victim has or 
had a close and loving relationship.
35
 
 
His Honour saw little point in wasting curial resources by requiring persons who are related as, for example, 
spouses, siblings, de facto partners or engaged couples, to prove the closeness and loving nature of the 
relationship between them. Instead the administration of justice was better served by a fixed rule that persons 
in such relationships, despite the possibility of estrangement, must always  be in the contemplation of a 
wrongdoer as a person who may be affected by his or her conduct. Further, the wrongdoer must always have 
in mind that any person may be able to establish a close and loving relationship with the person harmed and, 
therefore, constitute a neighbour who is owed a duty of care. Nevertheless, McHugh J did not regard a close 
and loving relationship as being a necessary condition of the existence of a duty of care. In other cases an 
association with the primary victim or being in their presence could be regarded as being sufficient to give 
rise to a duty to take reasonable care to protect a person from suffering psychiatric harm. This was the case 
where the person suffering psychiatric harm saw or heard the accident or its aftermath. Accordingly, 
McHugh J recognised that a duty to take care could exist even though the primary victim and the person 
suffering psychiatric harm had no pre-existing relationship. He saw this as consistent with the view of 
Gummow and Kirby JJ in Tame-Annetts that: 
 
Distance in time and space from a distressing phenomenon, and means of communication or 
acquisition of knowledge concerning that phenomenon, may be relevant to assessing reasonable 
  
foreseeability, causation and remoteness of damage in a common law action for negligently 
inflicted psychiatric illness. But they are not themselves decisive of liability.
36
  
 
In the present case, the relationship between the children and their father meant that the defendant ought to 
have had in mind that any harm caused to its employee carried the risk that it could cause psychiatric harm to 
any of his children who might thereafter learn of his death.
37 
 
Gummow and Kirby JJ thought that psychiatric injury to children of an employee was a consequence which 
the defendant employer, judged by the standard of a reasonable person, ought to have foreseen. Moreover, 
they considered that in attempting to define the scope of liability in negligence it was useful to identify the 
interest which was sufficient to attract protection of the law in any given field.
38
 As was noted in 
Tame-Annetts, Australian law sought to protect in an appropriate case the plaintiff's freedom from serious 
mental harm that manifested itself in a recognisable psychiatric illness. More specifically, the law placed 
particular emphasis on the protection of the young from serious harm. Both general law and contemporary 
statute law had treated the relationship between parent and child as a primary means by which to secure the 
public interest in the nurturing of the young.
39
 Their Honours noted that the case shared important 
characteristics with the relationship in Annetts, where it was not disputed that the relationship of parent and 
child would be sufficient to import a duty of care on the part of the defendant to avoid causing psychiatric 
illness to the parents as a consequence of the wrongful death of their child. The plaintiffs here had no way of 
protecting themselves against the risk of psychiatric harm that transpired. The defendant controlled the 
conditions under which the deceased worked and had a significant and perhaps exclusive degree of control 
over the risk of harm to him and of the risk of consequent psychiatric harm to his children. The defendant's 
control of the risk of harm was direct in both the legal and practical sense, rather than remote. There was no 
inconsistency between the existence of a duty of care to the children and the legitimate pursuit by the 
defendant of its business interests, since the duty of care to the children would at most be co-extensive with 
the tortious and contractual duties that it owed the deceased directly as his employer.
40
  
 
Hayne J reiterated the view that he expressed in Tame-Annetts,
41
 that if liability for psychiatric injury 
embraced all conditions that psychiatric medicine classified as a form of 'psychiatric injury', it would be 
necessary to develop one or more new control devices in substitution for those which had been rejected by 
the High Court in Tame-Annetts, ie, normal fortitude, sudden shock and direct perception. Such new control 
mechanisms might become evident as knowledge about the causes of psychiatric injury and the effect of 
  
traumatic events increased. That said, Hayne J thought that following Tame-Annetts he was bound to 
conclude that an employer owed a duty to take reasonable care to avoid psychiatric injury to at least an 
employee's children. Like Annetts, the closeness of the pre-existing relationships between the three parties -- 
employee, employer and children -- coupled with the fact that it was reasonably foreseeable that the children 
might suffer psychiatric injury on learning of their father's accidental death or serious injury at work, 
required the conclusion that a duty to take reasonable care to avoid psychiatric injury was owed by an 
employer to the employee's children. Moreover, it was not relevant that the three children were not living 
with the deceased, that two of the children were in the workforce or that the oldest of the three was an adult. 
The conclusion that a duty of care was owed flowed from the combination of the facts that the defendant as 
employer of the plaintiffs' father controlled the work that he did, and how and where he did it, thus requiring 
the defendant as employer to take reasonable care and to ensure that reasonable care was taken to avoid harm 
to employees, and that the employer could reasonably foresee that the children of the employee might suffer 
psychiatric injury if the employee were killed or seriously injured at work.
42
  
 
Callinan J adhered to what he had said in Tame-Annetts.
43
 In that case his Honour had summarised the 
relevant principles as follows: 
 
There must have occurred a shocking event. The claimant must have actually witnessed it, or 
observed its immediate aftermath or have had the fact of it communicated to him or her, as 
soon as reasonably practicable, and before he or she has or should reasonably have reached a 
settled state of mind about it. The communicator will not be liable unless he or she had the 
intention to cause psychiatric injury, and was not otherwise legally liable for the shocking 
event. A person making the communication and the performance of a legal or moral duty will 
not be liable for making the communication. The event must be such as to be likely to cause 
psychiatric injury to a person of normal fortitude. The likelihood of psychiatric injury to a 
person of normal fortitude must be foreseeable. There need to exist special or close 
relationships between the tortfeasor, the claimant and the primary victim. Those relationships 
may exist between the employer and employee and co-employees and relationships of the kind 
here in which assurance was sought, and given, and dependence and reliance accordingly 
ensued. Other relationships may give rise to liability in future cases. A true psychiatric injury 
directly attributable to the nervous shock must have been suffered.
44
 
 
  
Accordingly the case was remitted to the NSW District Court to determine whether there had been a breach 
of the duty of care to the plaintiffs' father and whether in the circumstances the plaintiffs had suffered 
psychiatric injury as opposed to mere emotional distress or ordinary grief.   
 
4. The current common law landscape in Australia 
Before the recent three decisions of the High Court, the task of lower courts was likened by one judge to 
navigating 'uncertain seas ... by the charts of the leading cases in the High Court',
45
 which were described as 
'maps [which] are authoritative, yet ... somewhat dated'.
46
 The decisions in Tame-Annetts and Gifford may 
have served to update the maps and given clear direction in some respects, but those hoping for a removal of 
all uncertainty in this long troubling area will have been disappointed. Indeed, there are still areas that might 
rightly be marked with the customary caution: 'Here there be dragons!' What then is the current position 
concerning psychiatric injury claims at common law in Australia? 
 
There is no doubt that in order to recover, a plaintiff must show a recognisable psychiatric illness. This 
requirement not only serves as a description of the damage regarded as being worthy of compensation, but 
also an important limitation on the claims that might be brought. 
 
All of the High Court judges saw a role for normal fortitude. Notions of the plaintiff's expected conformity to 
a standard of 'normal susceptibility' may be traced back as far as cases such as Dulieu v White & Sons  and 
Phillimore J's 'ideal vir constans'.
47
 In the High Court, it appeared in Chester in the form of the expectations 
of a 'normal mother'; and in the House of Lords in Bourhill v Young, Lord Wright referred to 'normal 
fortitude' and Lord Porter to 'customary phlegm' as being a relevant consideration when determining 
reasonable foreseeability.
48
 In Page v Smith,
49
 however, a majority of the Law Lords saw normal fortitude as 
a precondition to recovery only in secondary victim cases. 
 
In Tame-Annetts only McHugh and Callinan JJ and possibly Hayne J may be seen to have favoured the 
concept being a precondition to recovery. The other judges saw the concept as merely being a factor that 
informs the assessment of reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric injury in the circumstances. As Gummow 
and Kirby JJ pointed out in Tame-Annetts: 'It may be that, in some circumstances, the risk of a recognisable 
psychiatric illness to a person who falls outside the notion of "normal fortitude" is nonetheless not 
far-fetched or fanciful.'
50
 Moreover, while Gummow and Kirby JJ prefer foreseeability of normal fortitude as 
  
being relevant to breach,
51
 it would seem that the other five judges supported the more traditional analysis of 
it being a matter affecting duty of care. 
 
There would also seem to be differences in the meaning of the term, which directly impacts upon the way 
that it is applied in practice. The term is without medical legitimacy: every person has his or her own 
breaking point. As much was expressly recognised by Gleeson CJ in Tame-Annetts
52
 and Lord Wright's often 
overlooked caveat 'a reasonably normal condition, if medical evidence is capable of defining it, would be the 
standard'.
53
 When the issue arises at trial there would appear to be at least three different ways of a court 
determining the issue:  
 
(1)  by relying on medical evidence that the particular plaintiff had a special susceptibility and for 
that reason could not be regarded as a person of 'normal fortitude';  
(2)  by relying on the intuitive judgment of medical experts as to whether the particular plaintiff's 
reaction was that of a person of 'normal fortitude'; or  
(3)  through the judge's own intuitive judgment as to whether the particular plaintiff's reaction was 
that of a person of 'normal fortitude'. 
 
There are difficulties with each. For example, reliance on the evidence concerning a particular plaintiff may 
not provide guidance concerning the existence of a duty for other cases. It might be argued that an objective 
approach to normal fortitude should instead depend on the reaction of a hypothetical person placed in the 
same circumstances as the plaintiff, which would make reference to the specific make-up of the plaintiff 
concerned irrelevant. As for the issue being decided by intuition, it might be pointed out that intuitive 
judgments are not a new thing to the law. However, that does not necessarily make it a desirable approach. 
Intuitive decisions may consciously or subconsciously be affected by the predilections of the judgment 
maker. Different views may be formed on the same facts by different judges and inconsistency may result. 
While at the end of the day it may be that in most cases there will be general agreement about how the 
mythical normal person would react, it will be the difficult cases -- such as psychiatric injury resulting from 
loss of a beloved pet,
54
 witnessing the coffin of a loved one being overturned,
55
 or being trapped in a stalled 
lift for a lengthy period
56
 -- where the intuitive approach may be found wanting. 
 
In a contrast with the prevailing position in England, all members of the High Court except Callinan J have 
rejected factors such as sudden shock and direct perception as being preconditions to recovery. Instead, these 
  
factors were also viewed as being matters which assisted in the assessment of reasonable foreseeability and 
causation on the facts of the case. This would seem a sensible approach, which avoids the drawing of 
arbitrary and indefensible lines between otherwise equally meritorious grounds. Gifford is a good example of 
this point. Sound reasons were advanced in the High Court in justification of allowing the children to 
recover, including the close and loving relationship that could be presumed to exist between them and their 
parents, provided they could show that they had suffered the requisite measure of damage. Had the case 
arisen in the United Kingdom, however, it would have been summarily dismissed on the arbitrary grounds of 
absence of close proximity and of direct perception. 
 
Besides the specific comments regarding claims for psychiatric injury, there were also interesting 
observations made by various members of the court concerning determination of a duty of care and breach of 
duty. In Tame-Annetts McHugh J made the observation, which Callinan J described as persuasive and to be 
'heeded by all courts',
57
 that definition of reasonable foreseeability, in terms of an undemanding 'not 
far-fetched or fanciful' test, and separation of foreseeability and preventability of risk at the breach stage, 
could explain many of the recent lower court judgments which had been criticised as being excessive. His 
Honour suggested that at a duty level there ought to be a return to Lord Atkin's original formulation, with 
emphasis placed on the reasonableness of any foreseeability. While foreseeability was a question of fact, 
reasonableness required a value judgment.
58
 On the other hand, breach was better seen as whether the 
defendant knew or ought to have recognised that he or she had created an unreasonable risk, in the sense of 
one which reasonable members of the community would think was sufficiently great that it required 
preventative action.
59 
 
In both Tame-Annetts and Gifford Gleeson CJ also stressed the 'reasonable' aspect of reasonable 
foreseeability. In Gifford his Honour remarked: 'The limiting consideration is reasonableness, which requires 
that account be taken both of interests of plaintiffs and of burdens on defendants.'
60 
 
There were instances of the use in the context of psychiatric injury of terminology which has become more 
familiar in other spheres, such as pure economic loss. In Gifford, Gummow and Kirby JJ noted that in 
attempting to define the scope of liability in negligence it was useful to identify the interests which are 
sufficient to attract the protection of the law in any given field, citing Perre v Apand.
61
 Their Honours then 
married this proposition with a repetition of a statement they made in Tame-Annetts  that the interest 
protected by Australian law was not merely 'peace of mind', as in America, but rather the plaintiff's freedom 
  
from serious mental harm which manifests itself in a recognisable psychiatric illness. Further, they drew on 
the observation by Gaudron J in Hawkins v Clayton
62
 -- that a duty to avoid economic loss might more 
readily be found where there was an interference with or impairment of an existing right which is known or 
ought to be known to the defendant, than where there is no such infringement -- to conclude that a duty to 
avoid psychiatric injury to the child of an initial victim would more readily be imposed where recognised 
rights in the initial victim are infringed.
63
 Finally, their Honours saw common characteristics in the 
relationships in Annetts  and Gifford, such as the fact that the plaintiffs had no way of protecting themselves 
against the risk of psychiatric harm, the fact that the defendant controlled the conditions under which the 
initial victim worked and held a significant if not exclusive degree of control over the risk of harm to the 
plaintiffs, and the lack of any inconsistency between the existence of a duty of care and the legitimate pursuit 
by the defendant of its business interests.
64
 Hayne J, too, stressed the importance of the defendant's control of 
the initial victim's work conditions as an important factor in establishing a duty of care in the circumstances. 
These characteristics bear a close similarity to the salient features of the duty of care to avoid economic loss 
examined in cases like Perre v Apand Ltd. 
 
5.  A fractured landscape: the Ipp Report and tort reform legislation 
The decision in Tame-Annetts was handed down shortly before a panel constituted by the Federal 
Government and chaired by Justice Ipp conducted a review of the law of negligence as it applied to cases of 
personal injury. The review was prompted by community concerns regarding massive increases in insurance 
premiums.
65
 Under the terms of reference the panel was required to develop a 'principled' approach to reform 
of the common law with the 'objective of limiting liability and quantum and damages arising from personal 
injury and death'. However, the panel's task was made difficult by the imposition of a ridiculously short 
timeframe for reporting (less than two months for a preliminary report on some terms of reference deemed to 
be of immediate importance with a further month thereafter for the full report)
66
 and an entire absence of 
empirical evidence from the insurance industry substantiating any assertion that the industry was in crisis. 
The panel indeed acknowledged that in the dearth of hard evidence, its recommendations were based: 
 
primarily on the collective sense of fairness of its members, informed by their knowledge and 
experience, by their own researches and those of the panel's secretariat and by the advice and 
submissions of those who have appeared before the panel and who have made written 
representations to it.
67
 
 
  
There was no specific term of reference dealing with liability for psychiatric injury. However, there were 
general terms of reference related to duty of care and other elements of the negligence action in general and 
the panel thought it necessary to include a section on claims for mental harm. In essence, the report 
recommended that: 
 
o  there be no liability for mental harm unless it consisted of 'a recognised psychiatric illness' 
(Recommendation 34(a)); 
o  a panel of experts be appointed to develop guidelines for assessing whether a person had 
suffered 'a recognised psychiatric illness' (Recommendation 33); 
o  there be a requirement that the defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal 
fortitude might, in the circumstances suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care 
was not taken. For these purposes, the circumstances should include whether there was a 
sudden shock, whether the plaintiff was present at the scene of the accident or its aftermath, 
whether the plaintiff witnessed the accident or its aftermath with his or her unaided senses, 
whether there was a pre-existing relationship between plaintiff and defendant and the nature of 
the relationship between the plaintiff and any person killed, injured or put in peril 
(Recommendation 34(b) and (c)); 
o  the rules for a duty to arise should be the same irrespective of whether the claim is based in tort, 
contract, under statute or any other cause of action (Recommendation 35); 
o  contributory negligence on the part of the initial victim should reduce damages awarded to the 
secondary victim (Recommendation 36); 
o  the requirements of proof of a 'recognised psychiatric illness' and reasonable foreseeability of 
harm to a person of normal fortitude also should apply to claims for damages for economic loss 
for mental harm consequent upon physical injury (Recommendation 37); 
o  a system of accreditation of forensic psychiatric experts should be developed 
(Recommendation 38). 
The legislative response to these recommendations has ranged from enactment of most in New South Wales 
to enactment of none in Queensland and the Northern Territory. 
 
Recommendation 34 has been adopted in most jurisdictions.
68
 It purports to give effect to the High Court's 
decision in Tame-Annetts, although as noted above this is not a simple matter in light of the disparity in the 
judgments when it came to the role and application of the notion of 'normal fortitude'. One point of 
distinction, however, would seem to be that the Ipp Report would elevate the matter to an essential 
  
prerequisite, whereas strictly speaking only two members of the High Court thought that it bore this 
significance. To the extent that the report stipulated a catalogue of relevant circumstances to be taken into 
account, it suggests an objective test based on the reaction of a hypothetical person. It is important that the 
inclusive nature of the list be recognised, with the factors on the list judged in a qualitative rather than 
quantitative fashion, the weightiness of one item compensating for the lack of influence of another or others. 
Checking off the items in isolation and then deciding on the basis of the preponderance of affirmative or 
negative responses may be tantamount to treating the items on the list as prerequisites, contrary to the clear 
message emerging from Tame-Annetts  and the panel's intent to restate it. 
 
The danger inherent in a formulistic treatment of the catalogue is made more apparent when it is realised that 
the list was clearly drawn with secondary victim scenarios primarily in mind. There may be a temptation for 
a court considering a 'primary victim' case to discard those items on the list that may only be relevant in a 
secondary victim scenario and to then seek to apply those items remaining. Indeed, this may explain why 
when the recommendation was enacted in Tasmania, the catalogue of relevant circumstances was reduced to 
the only two which might be considered as applicable to both primary and secondary cases: whether the 
mental harm was suffered as a result of a sudden shock and whether or not there was a pre-existing 
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.
69
 This will become problematic if this discarding 
process -- whether by the court or by the Tasmanian legislature -- has the effect of placing undue emphasis 
on these two factors, in particular the presence of a sudden shock. It is true that in denying sudden shock the 
status of a precondition to liability, some members of the High Court indicated that it might still be relevant 
to reasonable foreseeability. Such comments were unfortunate. As Windeyer J once pointed out, the law's 
continued use of the antiquated expression 'nervous shock' is apt to mislead.
70
 Care is needed 'lest words used 
in one case become tyrants over the facts of another'.
71
 A focus on shock by the law has its origins in an 
unsophisticated nineteenth century understanding of science, and is an affront to the great advances in 
knowledge and understanding in psychiatric medicine since that time. The need for sudden shock was 
described by Gummow and Kirby JJ in Tame-Annetts as having 'no root in principle and therefore ...  
arbitrary and inconsistent in application'.
72
 Cases of prolonged suffering as opposed to sudden shock, as their 
Honours pointed out, are more appropriately dealt with as matters of causation and remoteness, not through 
denial of duty.
73 
 
It is imperative, therefore, that courts stay open to the potential influence of circumstances other than those in 
the catalogue, particularly those in a primary victim scenario. These might include, for example, the 
  
plaintiff's age in a school bullying case. It would be unrealistic to judge such a plaintiff by the 'normal 
fortitude' of an adult.
74
 Similarly, a claim by a traumatised emergency worker could not sensibly be judged 
against the standard of a 'normal person', for whom a car accident might be a once-in-a-lifetime event rather 
than a daily encounter.
75
 It might even be suggested that in a multicultural society, the expectations of the 
plaintiff's 'normal fortitude' should, in an appropriate case, take into account what might be considered a 
'normal' reaction for those of the plaintiff's cultural background.
76 
 
A further difficulty with recommendation 34 and the legislation based on it is the use of the term 'recognised 
psychiatric illness' to describe the compensable form of mental harm. Strictly speaking, this differs from the 
common law definition of the relevant damage, ie, recognisable  psychiatric illness. The former denotes a 
condition that has been recognised as a psychiatric illness, presumably by psychiatric experts. By contrast, 
the latter reflects a condition that may be described as a psychiatric illness, even though there may be 
difficulty assigning the condition a recognised name. This is an important distinction in a dynamic field like 
psychiatric medicine. For example, the disorder today known as post-traumatic stress disorder first appeared 
as such in the third edition of the commonly-used diagnostic instrument the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) in 1980, as a result of the wealth of research into the trauma suffered 
by Vietnam War combatants. The disorder, however, may be traced to a condition known as 'gross stress 
reaction' in the first edition of the instrument, published in 1952. For some reason, however, this category of 
reaction was dropped completely from the second edition. Individuals might still have suffered a condition 
that might have been recognisable as a psychiatric illness even if, strictly speaking, it was not recognised by 
the major diagnostic instrument. 
 
The point might also be illustrated by reference to cases. In Mt Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey
77
 the plaintiff's rare 
type of schizophrenic reaction to the accident was compensated, even though the doctors were unable to 
settle on its proper label. Similarly, in Nader v Urban Transit Authority of New South Wales
78
 the plaintiff 
displayed symptoms of a condition known as Ganser Syndrome. There was disagreement in psychiatric 
circles as to whether this syndrome was psychotic in origin or a hysterical condition. While the symptoms 
did not fulfil the definition of any established recognised disorder,
79
 the NSW Court of Appeal was 
nevertheless satisfied to regard the plaintiff's condition as constituting a psychiatric illness.  
 
In defence of the panel, this may not have been a problem had recommendation 33 also been enacted or at 
least acted upon. In a sense, 'recognised psychiatric illness' is merely a label, no more or less than 
  
'recognisable psychiatric illness'. The true significance could have rested in the detail, which could have 
assigned the label 'recognised psychiatric illness' the same meaning presently understood to be denoted by 
'recognisable psychiatric illness'. However, this has not happened. Recommendation 33 has not been taken 
up by any of the legislatures. What remains is a change in the terminology and therefore possibly a change in 
the law.
80 
 
It is perhaps not surprising to discover that recommendation 37, which extends comparable provisions 
concerning the type of damage and normal fortitude to claims for mental harm consequent upon physical 
injury, has been enacted in the same jurisdictions.
81
 This measure overcomes the anomaly under the common 
law that damages for mental harm falling short of that otherwise regarded as required, namely recognisable 
psychiatric illness, might be recovered where it was consequent on a physical injury, no matter how minor. 
Recommendation 35 suggesting that the same rules for finding duty apply, regardless of how the claim is 
framed has been adopted in a small number of jurisdictions;
82
 while recommendation 36 proposing a change 
in the law, so that in a secondary victim claim the plaintiff's damages award may be reduced by contributory 
negligence on the part of the initial victim, has been adopted only in New South Wales.
83 
 
The Ipp Report considered the issue of limiting claims on the basis of direct perception or by prescribing the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the initial victim. However, it strongly recommended against this 
approach, which would be contrary to Tame-Annetts and, now, Gifford. Nevertheless, it proceeded to suggest 
possible relationships that might be prescribed by 'governments [which] may think that legislation enacting 
such a list would be desirable'.
84
 A number of jurisdictions have enacted provisions that impose arbitrary 
limits on secondary victim claims. In the absence of any rational basis for such arbitrary restrictions, the 
legislatures concerned have passed laws which they might believe fairly delineates cases warranting 
compensation, but which significantly differ from each other. 
 
New South Wales and Tasmania have taken a common line. In those States a plaintiff is not entitled to 
recover damages for pure mental harm unless the plaintiff 'witnessed, at the scene', the victim being killed, 
injured or put in peril, or is a close member of the family of the victim.
85
 'Close member of the family' 
reflects the list of relationships set out in the Ipp Report. 
 
  
In South Australia there will be a renumbered provision that damages may only be awarded for 'mental or 
nervous shock' if the injured person was physically injured in the accident or was 'present at the scene of the 
accident when the accident occurred', or a parent, spouse or child of the person killed, injured or endangered 
in the accident.
86
 Unlike the New South Wales and Tasmanian positions, there is no need for the plaintiff to 
actually 'witness' the accident scene, provided he or she may be said to be 'present'. 
 
Perhaps most problematic is the new Victorian section. This provides that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover 
damages for pure mental harm unless the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, the victim being killed, injured or 
put in danger, or 'is or was in a close relationship with the victim'.
87
 No attempt is made to define 'close 
relationship with the victim'. The term might be seen as embracing close family relationships. However, the 
section says nothing about a need for the relationship to be based on love and affection. It would be wrong to 
assume that the phrase necessarily equated with the English 'close ties of love and affection'. It is possible to 
conceive of other kinds of relationships which could fairly be described as 'close', but which have no basis in 
love. These might include, for example, co-workers, priest and parishioner, teacher and student, mentor and 
mentored. Such an interpretation might commend itself as being better able to reflect modern psychiatric 
understanding concerning the kinds of persons who might foreseeably be psychiatrically injured as the result 
of the death, injury or peril of another. 
 
The two territories have retained their versions of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 
(NSW).
88
 These provisions purport to 'extend' a defendant's liability for 'mental or nervous shock' to a parent, 
spouse or de facto partner of the victim; or another member of the family of the victim who was within the 
sight or hearing of the accident. As held in Gifford these provisions did not seek to fix definitive limits to 
recovery and have now been outflanked by the common law. Accordingly, in spite of these provisions, the 
common law is to be applied in both territories. 
 
Queensland has seen no need to enact any legislation concerning mental harm, while Western Australia 
enacted some of the Ipp recommendations, but has not sought to limit the circumstances in which a 
secondary victim might recover. The common law in this respect therefore also governs these two States. 
 
Some of this legislation preceded recent tort reform, while some formed part of it. The end result in any 
event is an Australian landscape for recovery by secondary victims which has never been so divided.  
  
 
6.  Conclusion 
In the 1990s the House of Lords in a number of cases examined the circumstances in which damages may be 
recovered for psychiatric injury in both primary and secondary victim cases. The result was that in the United 
Kingdom, other than proof of a recognisable psychiatric illness, secondary victim claims are subject to 
arbitrary limits concerning the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim, the plaintiff's 
proximity to the accident or its aftermath and direct perception of the accident or its aftermath. There is also 
a need for normal fortitude and shock. On the other hand,  primary victims need not even show that their 
reaction accorded with that of a person of normal fortitude. 
The High Court has now had a similar opportunity to consider primary and secondary victim claims, but with 
very different results. Much was decided in the dual judgment in Tame-Annetts, although it transpired that 
Annetts was not as good a vehicle for examination of secondary victim claims as it was first thought to be. 
Nevertheless, most of the court made obiter comments on this type of claim, comments which they were able 
to repeat in deciding Gifford 10 months later. The Australian common law that emerged requires the same 
form of damage as the United Kingdom -- a recognisable psychiatric illness -- but otherwise rejected shock 
and direct perception as preconditions. Instead, a majority regarded these matters as being factors that, like 
the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim, are relevant to an assessment of reasonable 
foreseeability and/or causation in the circumstances. Less clear, however, was the appropriate treatment of 
normal fortitude, with a majority regarding it also as a matter relevant to reasonable foreseeability rather than 
being a precondition, a different majority regarding its proper role as one affecting the existence of duty, and 
a different majority again seeing it as a purely objective question based on the reaction of a hypothetical 
person, in relation to which evidence of the particular plaintiff's susceptibility is irrelevant. 
 
Of interest were the comments by some members of the court about duty of care in general. These include 
indications by Gleeson CJ and McHugh J that attention should yet again return to Lord Atkin's neighbour 
principle. While foreseeability is an issue of fact, 'reasonable' involves a value judgment. Gummow and 
Kirby JJ in particular also used language previously used in relation to claims for pure economic loss, 
including the defendant's control over the risk of harm, a plaintiff's inability to protect himself or herself, and 
the absence of inconsistency between the existence of a duty and the defendant's legitimate pursuit of 
business interests. These comments might hold out the tantalising prospect that, despite past failures, at least 
some members of the court again may be thinking about a uniform approach to determining the existence of 
duty, or at least aspects of commonality in approaches. 
  
 
Examination of the present day common law in Australia is not realistic if not done in the context of the 
statutory reform which has taken place in some jurisdictions. The legislation that followed the Ipp Panel's 
review of negligence was not uniform in the recommendations that were enacted. Moreover, there are four 
different legislative responses to the question of secondary victim claims. Accordingly, at a time when so 
much more is now known about psychiatric medicine, the law governing psychiatric claims in Australia has 
never been more divided.  
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